The Israeli HAMAS War

THE ISRAEL HAMAS WAR
Taboo Topics, Truths, and Lies
Douglas Weeks, PhD

The murder of approximately 1,200 civilian men, women, and children in towns, a Kibutbutzim, a military base, and a music festival in southern Israel by HAMAS (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya) shocked the world. However, less shocking (if not wholly anticipated) has been the Israeli response, the response by Israel’s allies (namely the US), and response within the broader Middle East. Moreover, despite the overwhelming media coverage highlighting the initial Israeli (and now the ongoing Palestinian) civilian death tolls, the media accounts have focused on the here and now, without fully addressing the historic legacy of this conflict or what the actual outcome might be. Although a limited number have attributed the conflict to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and fewer still to the negotiations and agreements that took place as a means to end WWI, none have told the whole story. To understand the current events, one has to understand that there is more to the current war than simply avenging the deaths of the innocent men, women, and children who died on 07 October and destroying HAMAS in the process. Much more.

Whenever the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict is discussed, highly visceral issues are immediately raised regardless of whether one is sympathetic to the Israeli position or the Palestinian position. Allegations of antisemitism and casting the Palestinians as terrorists surface instantly. Without question, innocent people have been killed on both sides, but neither side is an innocent party in this conflict. Having spent a considerable time in both Israel and Palestine researching this conflict during and immediately after the Second Intifadah, I can attest that the realities on the ground are significantly different than the reporting typically found in the world’s media.

Allow me first to say that HAMAS is a terrorist organisation. Regardless of the underlying circumstances, there is no morally defensible argument that justifies murdering innocent men, women, and children as they did on 07 October. Additionally, the HAMAS Charter unreservedly calls for the destruction of Israel.

This is not the first attack by HAMAS on innocent Israeli civilians, nor are they the only Palestinian entity to target civilians. During the First Intifada (1987-1993), Fatah, The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ),The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, HAMAS, and others engaged in violence against Israeli civilians.

During the Second Intifada (2000-2005), the same militant groups once again took up arms against the Government of Israel and its citizens. Civil unrest, random knife and shooting attacks were common, but more dramatically, suicide bombings in cafes, buses, nightclubs, and any other place where people congregated accentuated the frustration of the Palestinians and the lengths that Palestinian militant groups would go to communicate that frustration.

Alongside the harsh realities that the Israeli Government has imposed on the Palestinian people, Jewish settlers have routinely targeted Palestinian villages destroying their crops, interrupting their water supply, and threatened or engaged in violence against them. Thus, there has been a concerted effort by both the Israeli Government and Jewish settlers to drive the Palestinians from what the Jews regard as their land.

After three months of war, over 22,000 Palestinians killed, another 60,000 injured, various members of the Israeli Government (undoubtedly under pressure from the US and in advance of having to defend itself before the UN Security Council regarding allegations of genocide) have begun to provide their vision of what a post war Gaza would look like. Although the post war plans for Gaza still need to be finalised and approved by the government, the details that are beginning to emerge highlight the extreme factions within the Israeli Government.

The Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant has proposed that the governance of Gaza be turned over to some yet-to-be-determined Palestinian body to manage. However, others such as Itamar Ben-Gvir, the Israeli National Security Minister have called for Israeli settlers to move to Gaza to encourage the Palestinians to emigrate. Similarly, the Israeli Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich has called on Palestinians to leave Gaza so that Israelis can repopulate the area and “make the desert bloom.”

To understand this conflict correctly, one must understand the entirely of its history, not just the last 100 or so years.

Both Jews and Muslims (and several others) are indigenous to the greater Middle East and particularly the area traditionally known as Palestine. Many Jews believe that God, through the Prophet Moses, gave them divine guidance to return and settle in the land of Canaan (southern Lebanon to northern Egypt and from the Mediterranean to western Jordan) after escaping their captivity in Egypt, which they did. This belief created a sense of ownership of a promised land. In Palestine, they built two temples that were eventually destroyed by the Babylonians in 587 BCE and the Romans in 70 CE respectively.

The Palestinians and other indigenous Muslims unquestionably have similar historical roots to the land of Palestine that date back as far as the Jews. But, unlike the Jews, they do not view Palestine as a promised land divinely given to them by God. There are significant religious sites like Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque (where it is believed that Muhammad made his Night Journey and ascended to heaven- Isra and Mi’raj) but the Palestinians do not share the same belief that the land was divinely deeded to them by God. That is not to say that they don’t view Palestine as their home, they most certainly do, but the distinction between land ownership versus land that is believed to be divinely promised to them is important.

Palestine has come under siege and sacked numerous times throughout history by the Assyrians, Jews Babylonians, Romans, early Muslims, Seljuks, Christians, Mongols, Mamluks, Ottomans, and more. Each time the area fell to another ruling party, Jews typically fled to avoid persecution then returned when the political environment allowed. The Jewish Diaspora began well before the Roman period and extends well into the 20th century.

During the time of Muhammad, there was a large Jewish community in Medina. While in Medina, Muhammad and his followers had several battles with the ruling tribe of Mecca, the Quraish. After the Battle of Badr and again after the Battle of the Trench, the Jews of Medina were expelled after being suspected of collaborating with the Meccans and opposing the political rule of Muhammad. Much of that political opposition likely developed because the Jews (who had approximately 1900 years of highly defined and ingrained religious practices), resisted acknowledging Muhammad as a prophet. Many suggest it is at this point that the historical divide began.

For several centuries, Islam expanded prolifically throughout the Middle East, across northern and central Africa, and into southern Europe. Although there were successive changes in leadership after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 (first, the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the Umayyad and Abbasid Empires, and finally the Ottomans), Palestine generally remained under Islamic rule from approximately 638 until the end of WWI in 1918.

In the days leading up to the end of WWI, the West (primarily the British and French) began negotiating with Hussein bin Ali of Mecca to gain support of the Arabs to help end the war. In exchange, there were promises made that when the Ottoman Empire was dissolved, much of the Middle East would remain under Arab rule (except for Syria). Although the negotiations with Hussein bin Ali likely included discussions about Palestine, it was not explicitly mentioned in the correspondence of record. That process is referred to as the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915. After successful negotiation, the Arab Revolt began.

With the Arabs on their side, the balance of war shifted in favour of the West. Knowing the war would end in the foreseeable future, the Western powers began conceptualising how to manage a post-war Middle East including Palestine. Through another round of negotiations, the British, French, and Russians devised a plan whereby spheres of influence and control over some of the same areas that were promised to Hussein bin Ali would be ‘managed’ by the British and French. That agreement is referred to as the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.

The concept of Zionism by Theodor Herzl by that time had already been in place for a couple of decades and Jewish migration from Europe back to Palestine had already begun. The first Balfour Declaration (1917) was presented before Parliament and supported the idea that a national home for the Jewish people should be established in Palestine. In 1926, a revised and updated Balfour Declaration was adopted (by which time Palestine was under British control). The same support for Jewish immigration to Palestine was included but also incorporated the following quote “…nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine…” (Balfour Declaration, 1926).

Following WWI and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1924, the task of ‘managing’ Palestine, other portions of the Middle East, and areas across northern Africa was given to the League of Nations. However, the Sykes-Picot Agreement was largely honoured because of the support and influence of the allied powers: Britain, France, and the United States. The influence of the allied powers over the League of Nations was significant and two primary principles were supported by the West: dividing the area up into nation states and managing the area through colonial rule. As a result, many of the promises that had been made to Hussein bin Ali were not recognized, the area was colonized by the French and British, and new nation states were created.

As mentioned above, during the final years of the Ottomans, the dream of a Jewish homeland was created, and the Zionist movement began in earnest. Because of their origins, their religious beliefs, and because the first and second temples were built in Palestine, the Jews naturally chose to return to that area. Beginning in approximately the 1890’s, Jews began to emigrate back to Palestine. Originally, they came in small numbers and worked and lived collectively and harmoniously with the local Palestinians. Once the League of Nations came into being (1920-1946), they regulated and attempted to restrict how many Jews were allowed into Palestine. However, Jews continued to migrate to Palestine and tension developed between the immigrant Jews and indigenous Palestinians over land ownership and economic issues.

At the end of WWII and the realities of the Holocaust became known, immigration was allowed to increase. After years of political lobbying and obtaining tremendous support following the Holocaust, Jews persuaded the newly formed United Nations to grant them a permanent home in Palestine. As the partition plan for Palestine was being developed, there was opposition to the creation of the State of Israel because of a disproportionate land to population allocation. The Jews represented approximately 40 percent of the population yet received 57 percent of the land whereas the Palestinians represented approximately 60 per cent of the population but only received 43 per cent of the land. There were also other disputes about the utility of the land, access to natural resources such as water, etc.

The Partition Plan also included a provision that Jerusalem would become an international city managed by the U.N. This created additional tension between Muslims, Jews, and Christians because Jerusalem (which included al Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock, the third holiest site in Islam, the Western Wall, the only remaining portion of the Second Temple and holiest site for Jews, and Church of the Nativity, regarded by many to be the holiest site in Christianity) would now be out of their control. However, rather than resolve the inequities and religious tensions first, the U.N. allowed the creation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948.

The day following Israel’s independence, the first of many Arab/Israeli wars began. Israel, with the support from the West prevailed in the War of Independence and not only retained all of its allocated land under the United Nations Partition Plan, but also gained more land further increasing the rift associated with the disproportionate land to population issue. During the time of Israel’s quest for independence and the months that followed, approximately 700,000 Palestinians were either expelled or left voluntarily anticipating the violence would subside and that one day they would return to their homes. During the same time, Jewish immigration soared and many of the areas that were vacated by the Palestinians were re-inhabited by the Jews. Another outcome of the war was that Jordan gained control of the area now referred to as the West Bank, and approximately half of Jerusalem. The half that Jordan controlled included the three prominent religious sites. Jerusalem went from being an international city to a divided city with both Jewish and Christian religious sites under Jordanian (Muslim) control. Access was limited and tensions increased significantly.

As pan Arab nationalism soared under the aspirations of Gamal Nasser of Egypt, several Middle East countries came together in 1967 in an attempt to correct what they believed was the injustice that had been created in 1948: the creation of the State of Israel, a defeat of Arab armies in the War of Independence, and to establish the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. As they amassed their armies on the border of Israel, war quickly ensued, and the third Arab/Israeli war began. Not only did the Arab powers fail to achieve their goals, they were significantly defeated by Israel, who continued to be supported politically and militarily by the West (mostly the US). This defeat allowed Israel to push the Jordanians back to the east bank of the Jordan River, take over and occupy the area referred to as the West Bank, occupy the Sinai, unite Jerusalem as a single city under Jewish rule, take over Gaza, and take the Golan Heights away from Syria. This defeat was an overwhelming blow to Arab pride and left the idea of pan Arab nationalism in ruin. Additionally, approximately 200,000 more Palestinians and 100,000 Syrians became refugees. Many of the Palestinians fled to Jordan where they were allowed to stay until they were ousted in 1970. After being expelled from Jordan, most of the displaced Palestinians settled in southern Lebanon.

Although several additional wars have been fought (with the exception of the Sinai Peninsula which was given back to Egypt in 1979), the land issues have remained unchanged since 1967. In sum, in 19 years, the Palestinians went from relative independence (albeit under the British colonial rule) to having approximately 900,000 people living as refugees, having no political control except what was ceded to them by the Israelis, and now live under an occupying force. These issues continue to define the state of the Palestinians today as they have since 1967. The only significant differences being that the number of refugees has increased, their economic position has worsened, and any hope of self-determination incrementally fades each year. Additionally, as Israeli settlements expand, Palestinians continue to lose more land and the prospects of a two-state solution become less obtainable in each successive year. Current estimates are that there are nearly 400,000 Israeli Jews living in West Bank settlements and the number continues to increase each year.

The Palestinian perspective is that they have little left to lose. Many have lived as refugees for the past sixty years and all are now living under Israeli military control where freedom of movement, access to medical care, economic trade, access to natural resources, and fertile land to support their population has been strictly limited. Many have reached the point of seeing no other solution to the conflict and as a result support armed resistance. However, it should be stated again that armed resistance against the government of Israel and murdering men women and children are two very different things. While the former continues to gain support, far fewer support the latter.
Because the Palestinians have little else to fall back on, religion has become a pillar of support for their struggle. Although there are some historical religious tensions between Muslims and Jews, they have generally lived peacefully side by side up until the 20th century. If the conflict were to end tomorrow, the Palestinians would still be Muslim and identify with Islamic values and the Jews would still be Jewish and identify with Jewish values. Ironically, many of those values are quite similar. The real problem is land, economics, and the right of self-rule. Although there are religious undertones, the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict is an ethno-nationalist conflict, not a Jew vs Muslim conflict.

Regardless of which side of the argument one tends to identify with regarding the conflict, the issues become very visceral for those that follow it. For those watching from the outside, opinions are based on a complex mixture of religion, social justice, politics, human rights, security, and universal freedoms.

The current Israeli HAMAS War in one sense is simply another iteration of a conflict that has been underway for the last 80 years. That statement is not meant to diminish the lives lost since October 7. The callous disregard and clear targeting of civilian populations by both sides is nothing short of terrorism. The preceding historical account is only offered to provide some understanding of why it is happening, not to justify it.

On a more sobering note, several reports suggest that Israel was made aware by the Egyptians that something was about to happen. However, Israel, which has one of the best intelligence infrastructures in the world, neither appears to have predicted the attack on October 7, nor have they offered any explanation as to why they did not increase security once they were notified by the Egyptians.

Given the history, one troubling possibility is that the Israeli Government anticipated the incursion to be small, without the loss of life (or at least minimal), and allowed it to happen to establish justification for military actions against HAMAS. That is speculative but is one of the few logical explanations as to why the October 7th happened.

Whatever the end game is, Israel’s history of forcing Palestinians into refugee status, the indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, and the terror that the Palestinians are enduring, could certainly result in another large Palestinian diaspora if either Egypt or Jordan, or both open their borders to relieve Palestinian suffering.

Given that most of Gaza’s infrastructure has been destroyed, even if the Palestinians aren’t allowed to flee into neighbouring countries, there will be little left for them to return to. Irrespective of which scenario plays out, a massive amount of financial support from other nations will be required to sustain the Palestinians of Gaza whenever the current war ends. This is true regardless of whether they are refugees or not.

Despite increasing international pressure, Israel appears undeterred at reducing civilian casualties or willing to focus its efforts more squarely on HAMAS. With the death toll now exceeding 22,000, much of northern Gaza in ruin, and some 1,900,000 Palestinians displaced, this suggests that the recent comments by Ben-Gvir and Smotrich may have been the plan all along.

Even Israel’s staunchest ally, the US, has started to criticise its uncompromising disregard for Gaza’s civilian population. However, words are one thing and actions are another.

Realistically, the US is the one country in the world that can force Israel to change its tactics. As Israel’s main supplier of weaponry, and the country that provides Israel with the most economic aid, the US could simply threaten to stop the flow of either of those resources. In such a case, Israel would have no other choice but to change course. Unfortunately, despite purging huge amounts of political capital with other nations and undermining its carefully crafted image as the world’s leader and protector of human rights, the unwavering support by the US remains firm. The recent vetoing of the UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire, along with the continued flow of weaponry and economic assistance demonstrates that the US continues to prioritise its strategic alliance with Israel over the lives and wellbeing of the Palestinians.

When the war does end, and it will eventually, the political and economic costs to both Israel and the US will be tremendous. However, those costs will be minimal compared to the lives lost.

The Impacts of Ending Early Release

Last week the UK Government outlined its plan to pass emergency legislation in order to manage terrorism offenders more rigorously following the attacks of Usman Khan and Sudesh Amman. The most stringent of the proposed provisions require the end of automatic early release at the half-way point for those on ‘standard determinant sentences.’ If passed, prisoners convicted of a terror related offence will need to serve at least two-thirds of their sentence before a parole board will be allowed to consider their release. Those that do not receive parole board approval will remain in custody for their entire sentence. According to government figures, there are 224 TACT offenders currently in prison, and the new legislation will mean that approximately 50 will see their custodial time extended.

No doubt, there will be legal challenges to follow which may alter certain elements of the legislation, but it is expected to receive parliamentary approval. Other aspects of the proposal include increasing prison ‘deradicalisation’ schemes, increasing sentencing guidelines to 14 years for more serious offenses, and imposing more restrictive management plans once individuals are released. Some of the provisions are arguably well past due but others risk making the problem worse.

The idea that individuals who are clearly violent or who encourage others to be violent are eligible for early release is clearly not in the public’s best interest. Although some with extended sentences are already required to obtain parole board approval before they are considered for release, limiting that consideration solely based on the type of conviction is arguably a dangerous practice. The clear example here is Sudesh Amman who was convicted of possessing documents containing terrorist information and for disseminating terrorist publications. Amman was known to the authorities to advocate violence and justifiably required 24-hour surveillance by the police and secret service upon his release. In cases such as his, the government should have the authority to keep individuals in prison until they are determined not to pose a threat, including the whole of their sentence if necessary. However, the picture is much less clear for those who have not advocated violence and are serving custodial sentences for offences that did not involve or promote violence.

Within the government’s proposal “only a handful of minor offences – where there is a maximum penalty of 2 years or below – will be excluded. E.g. relating to ‘tipping off’ in relation to investigation in the regulated sector, wearing a uniform or displaying an article of a proscribed organisation or parking in contravention of a prohibition, and as such are low level offences.” Taking such a broad-brush approach to all but the most minor offences raises numerous questions about the longer-term effects of ‘exceptualising’ terror offenders compared to ‘ordinary criminals’ and the impacts of such an action. Without question, the attacks by Khan and Amman were horrific for the individuals and families involved, but those attacks should more correctly be viewed as outliers rather than representing an emerging trend or immanent threat.

Support for the conclusion above is found in David Anderson’s query to Parliament regarding the re-offending rates for terrorism offenders. The government’s response confirmed that between January 2013 and January 2019, only six individuals representing 3.06% of all terror offenders released from prison re-offended. Making that figure even more stark is that the recidivism rates for ‘ordinary criminals’ in the UK continues to hover around 48%. Although the figures from Anderson’s query are illuminating, they don’t tell the entire story.

Mr Anderson’s query only asked for the rate of recidivism and government did not provide any additional detail regarding the nature of the offences. Of key relevance here is whether the six individuals who re-offended were subsequently convicted of charges relating to violence. If so, then a more arguable position could be established that despite the low numbers, a trend is developing that more are turning to violence on release. Conversely, if the data demonstrated that the six individuals who re-offended were then convicted of offences that were not associated with violence, then the opposite conclusion could be held. Unfortunately, that information is not available in the public domain so no current assessment can be made.

The second missing element is to consider the trend of terrorism related convictions. If more individuals were being convicted of violence related offences, then one could argue that there is a need to take proactive measures to deal with the risk posed by those individuals. However, a review of the government’s published data that charts the conviction rates of terror related offenders and their offences through 2019 shows that not only are violence related convictions declining, the overall conviction rate for terrorism (TACT) and non-terrorism (Non-TACT) is at a four year low. Thus, while not all of the data is available, the data that is does not immediately support the government’s position that emergency legislation is warranted, nor does it support the idea that legislation is needed to interrupt an emerging trend.

As the government’s proposal confirms, the new regulation will only exclude those convicted of the most minor offences. For everyone else, their release will be predicated on receiving parole board approval. However, in an environment that has become more and more risk averse, that seems unlikely. A protocol already exists to ensure that parole boards have the information they need to make an informed risk analysis regarding the most violent offenders and that plan will surely be applied to all terror offenders. However, within that plan exists the power of parole boards to withhold sensitive information and to hear evidence in closed hearings. Additionally, there is little incentive by parole boards to take any chances on releasing terror offenders when their actions will only be judged in hindsight when something goes wrong.

The combination of increased jail time, treating those convicted of terror related crime differently than all other prisoners (violent or not), and allowing the fate of those individuals to be decided by a parole board who are not required to disclose the evidence they consider, be challenge-able in their decision, and have little incentive to release anyone will unquestionably foment greater resentment towards the government by the individuals affected, their families, their friends, and the wider community. For non-violent offenders, the best possible outcome will be that they remain unchanged. However, for some it will harden their position and make violence a more palatable option.

For those closest to the offender, his/her family and friends will surely challenge the fairness of such action and further bring the legitimacy of government into question. Given the government/community relationship is already under strain in some areas, the loss of additional political capital will simply provide opportunity for more radicalised political thought to take hold. Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that increased prison time is going to have a positive effect on risk. It simply defers the problem to a later date.

Although some government action is arguably warranted, it would be best applied with precision rather than too broadly. Not only does the data not support more aggressive action, being too aggressive may set in motion rebound effects that could have been anticipated and avoided. In short, careful consideration is needed as there is potentially far more to lose than there is to gain.