The terror attack perpetrated by Sudesh Amman on 02 February in Streatham (south London) which injured two people and resulted in his own death has once again hypersensitised the discussion regarding the imprisonment, automatic release, and management of individuals convicted of terror related offences. At the forefront of that discussion is whether those individuals can ever be ‘de-radicalised.’ Although the attack by Amman provided further urgency to the discussion, these questions began in the aftermath of the attack at Fishmongers Hall on 29 November 2019 when Usman Khan killed Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones.
In the wake of the attacks by Khan and Amman, a wide range of actions have been proposed by those inside and outside of government who believe that clamping down on terror offenders will make society safer. Suggestions have included a spectrum of actions including: abolishing automatic early release; requiring that all terror offenders serve a minimum of 2/3 of their sentence behind bars; further isolation of convicted terrorists from other inmates (including other convicted terrorists); requiring that parole boards approve the early release of anyone convicted of a terror related offence; subjecting convicted terrorists to polygraph tests pre and post release; tightening license agreements even further; and increasing the reporting requirements once an individual has been released.
At this point, the UK Government has not made public the full details of the emergency legislation that it hopes to pass by the end of the month. As such, it would be unfair at this point to be critical of such legislation until the full extent of the government’s proposal are known. Although controversial, the government’s actions are not entirely unjustified. Some individuals truly are dangerous and require further restrictions to keep the public safe. However, as the saying goes, the devil is always found in the details and I would argue that what is needed is a nuanced surgical approach that can be applied to the individuals that pose an actual risk rather than a blunt instrument approach that lumps anyone convicted of a terror offence in the same category or threat.
Core to the discussion here is that not everyone convicted of terror related offences advocates violence. In fact, government documents show that 37% of those charged with terror related offences in the UK between 2002 and 2019, were charged with offences that did not involve violence (e.g. possession of prohibited materials, dissemination of prohibited materials, contravening a control order, etc.). Although Amman was one of those who was jailed for possession of prohibited materials, it was well established before and after he went to prison that he promoted violence, and openly expressed his desire to die a martyr.
In the case of Usman Khan, he was convicted of planning violent action, yet by all accounts was turning his life around. What made him slip back into his desire to engage in violence is unknown. Although many have suggested that he was simply fooling those around him, until the public inquest into his attack is completed, those facts remain uncertain. What can be said with relative certainty is that he was not managed effectively in his post release period. Whether Khan was fooling those around him or somehow slipped back into extremism fails to appreciate the fact that literally hundreds of terrorism related offenders have been released and managed without incident.
Notwithstanding the terrible outcomes of these two attacks, what is often left out of the conversation is that terrorism offenders actually have a very low rate of recidivism. Depending on which study is cited, the percentages range in the single digits to low teens. In contrast, the recidivism rates of other ‘ordinary criminals’ hovers around 40%. Exactly why is another discussion but the fact remains that most terror related offenders simply don’t reoffend.
The fact that several have come out questioning whether radicalized individuals can be ‘de-radicalised’ more appropriately underscores their lack of knowledge about this environment. Not only are the vast majority of individuals not reoffending, there are numerous cases where individuals have stepped away from extremism following ‘de-radicalisation’ intervention. That should not be taken to say everyone can be ‘de-radicalised’ or that those who have been successfully rehabilitated shed all of their radical beliefs. More appropriately, it underscores the reality that many step away from the risks and stress that comes with extremism and choose more harmonious ways to engage with society.
As the government moves forward with its emergency legislation, it would do well to ensure that whatever additional coercive powers are exercised, are directed at those who pose the greatest risk. In most cases, that should mean those individuals known to advocate or be involved in violence. Further exceptualising (sic) terrorism from other forms of criminal behaviour risks other unintended consequences, not least of which is to drive some to assess that government actions have left them no choice but to engage in retributive violent action.